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1 Legal Artefacts and Conceptions of Nature
1 Legal institutions, legal systems, law in general are human artefacts: Not only they are
human-dependent entities—a lot of things are human-dependent and are not artefacts:
pollution, for example—, but they are created by humans as the object and outcome of a
specific, intentional process of creation. This is an idea that can be seen as an assumption
of both legal positivism and legal realism. Indeed, one could say that these two traditional
conceptions decline in different ways the same artefactual nature of law: On the one
hand, legal positivism focuses on the fact that law is an artefact created by an authority;
on  the  other  hand,  legal  realism focuses  on  the  fact  that  law  is  an  artefact  whose
functioning requires recognition and enforcement, and whose purpose and plan must be
continuously adapted through a process of interpretation and re-interpretation. 
2 Of course these artefacts are not built out of arbitrary considerations: There are a whole
lot of value problems, conditions of effectiveness, and even political factors that legal
institutions  cannot  but  address.  But,  apart  from these  obvious  connections,  another
possible question is  whether the fact  that law is  an artefact  completely rules out its
connection with the natural background: Is there a sense in which we can consider legal
institutions to be natural, other than artefactual? After all, this was the original intuition
of  the  most  ancient  among the  legal-philosophical  conceptions,  namely,  natural  law
theory: The idea was, at the outset, that the way in which legal institutions work can be
linked with the way in which nature works, that dike could be linked with kosmos, the
natural order. Of course, stated in this way this turns out to be a very general problem,
one that can be addressed in several different ways. For example, all the studies that aim
at  a  naturalization  of  law  or  at  a  description  of  law  in  evolutionary  terms  can  be
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conceived as studies that link the content of legal institutions with nature, at least in an
objective and scientific sense of nature: and much of contemporary scholarship in legal
theory is devoted to this side of the problem. But there is another interpretation of the
same problem which has not attracted the same amount of interest and attention: Is it
possible that the way in which legal artefacts are built and conceptualized is connected
with the way in which natural and physical phenomena are conceptualized? Is there a
connection between law and conceptions of nature? 
3 As said, this problem has not attracted much interest in the legal-philosophical literature,
but there is at least one exception, and luckily one that comes from the most outstanding
legal philosopher of the 20th century: Hans Kelsen’s book Society and Nature, of 1943. In
this wonderful work, Kelsen shows how several concepts that are crucial for the rising of
Western natural science in ancient Greek thought, among which the pre-socratic concept
of first cause, or arché, but even more importantly the very concept of causation, were the
outcome of a juridification of the natural world that in his view is typical of primitive
world views. In these views, Kelsen argues, nature is humanized, and natural events are
explained by means of intentions attributed to natural gods and hence in terms of these
gods’ power and their will to inflict sanctions or attribute rewards: Causation therefore
comes  from  retribution,  and  the  explanation  of  nature  depends  from  our  prior
understanding of society (see Kelsen 1943: 234ff.). 
4 Kelsen’s description of the relation between legal artefacts and conceptions of nature—let
us  call  it  the  “Social  Dependence  Model”—is  supported  by  an  impressive  amount  of
confirmations drawn from the sociological and anthropological literature of that time, to
the  point  that  Kelsen  himself  considered  his  research  to  be  mainly  “a  sociological
inquiry”,  which is  exactly the subtitle  of  the book.  And one could also say that  this
empirical support did not found significant criticism in the anthropological literature of
the last fifty years (but see Jabloner 1982 in the light of Garcia-Salmones 2011: 63f). Thus,
as  things  stand,  Kelsen’s  Social  Dependence  model  is  warranted  by  empirical
confirmation and in general can be considered as a reliable model of how conceptions of
nature can emerge from social (and legal) considerations. 
5 Contemporary cognitive psychology, however, adds further elements to the picture. The
literature  on  the  so-called  “embodied”  and  “grounded cognition”  (Barsalou  2008;
Glenberg & Gallese 2012; Borghi & Caruana 2015), a paradigm developed in the last thirty
years, shows that concepts are grounded in perception, action and emotional systems. An
important challenge for these views is to explain how higher-order abstract concepts are
represented (for an overview of recent theories, see Borghi et al. 2017): However, even if
they differ in ascribing an important role to linguistic, emotional or social experience for
abstract  concepts,  most  embodied  and  grounded  views  converge  in  contending  that
abstract concepts are grounded in our physical interactions with the environment. The
most  basic  experience of  the physical  world embedded in our perceptual  and motor
cognitive systems can be at the root of all kinds of abstract concepts, and hence—we
could conclude—also of legal institutions. Now, to be sure, Kelsen’s model is aimed at
drawing a phylogenesis of law, whereas embodied cognition can be used to address the
ontogenesis of our institutional concepts: not how they have evolved through history, but
rather  how  they  emerge  in  individual  cognition.  If  legal  institutions  are  artefacts,
however, it is reasonable to assume that the evolution of these artefacts be based on
common features of the cognitive system of us as individuals and authors/interpreters of
those artefacts. Hence, the question becomes: Are there good reasons to update Kelsen’s
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Social Dependence model in light of the embodied and grounded cognition paradigm?
One could imagine, for example, a more “dialectical” model, according to which the most
abstract and general concepts of natural science are traceable to social mechanisms (as in
Kelsen’s view), but the concepts of social and legal institutions are in their own turn
rooted in a basic conception of physical interactions with the natural world (as in the
“embodied cognition” view). 
6 Even from the point  of  view of  embodied cognition,  however,  it  is  not  necessary to
assume this modified, dialectical model. Indeed, the most interesting phenomenon in the
literature on abstract concepts adopting an embodied stance consists, in the last years, in
the  emergence  of  the  so-called  “Multiple  Representation views,”  according  to  which
abstract  concepts  are  not  only  grounded  in  perception  and  action  systems  but  also
activate emotional (Kousta et al. 2011; Newcombe et al. 2012), linguistic (Barsalou et al.
2008; Borghi & Binkofski 2014; Borghi & Zarcone 2016; Dove 2009, 2010, 2014) and social
experience (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings 2005;  Borghi et al.  2017;  Crutch et al.  2013).
Specifically, according to the Words As social Tools (WAT) view (Borghi & Cimatti 2009;
Borghi & Binkofski 2014) the conceptualization of abstract concepts can be traced not
only to patterns of physical  interactions but also to patterns of linguistic,  and hence
inherently social, interaction: Hence, the wider heterogeneity of the members of abstract
concepts makes the social and linguistic input coming from others a fundamental feature
of  their  acquisition  and  representation  in  the  brain.  In  this  perspective,  we  find  a
somewhat  modified  version  of  Kelsen’s  Social Dependence  model:  not  simply  a
dependence of natural, abstract concepts from more basic, social (and legal) concepts, but
rather a general dependence of all kinds of abstract concepts from patterns of social and
particularly linguistic interaction. Hence the previous question we have made—whether
Kelsen’s Social Dependence model should be amended and modified in the light of the
studies on embodied cognition—leads to another one: If we modify this model, what is the
direction we will  take? Should we (1) think of a full  Dialectical model in which basic
physical interaction grounds social (and legal) institutions, which in in their own turn
grounds  an higher-level  conceptualization of  nature,  or  rather  should  we simply  (2)
modify  the  Social  Dependence  model  in  the  sense  of  linguistic  social  interaction
grounding any abstract conceptualization, be it of society or nature?
7 In this paper, we present an experiment conceived and realized to test some conjectures
connected with this general problem. Our aim, of course, is not to give a definitive answer
to the questions presented above, but rather to provide some experimental results that
can be helpful, among other things, to view these general philosophical problems in a
new light. Moreover, this paper is also meant to provide new data for research on the
embodiment of abstract concepts,  and particularly of those specific abstract concepts
that depend on an institutional and legal framework. Our research would thus contribute
to an important new trend characterizing the most recent studies on abstract concepts.
Until some years ago abstract concepts were conceived of as a unitary class, and only
recently researchers have started to investigate the difference among them (for examples
see Ghio et al. 2013, 2016; Setti & Caramelli 2005; Crutch et al. 2013). This is striking,
because clearly abstract concepts come in a great variety, from emotions to numbers to
mental states to institutional concepts, and, on the other hand, there is a long tradition of
analyses of sub-categories of concrete concepts—for example, the different behavioural
patterns and brain representations associated to living and non living kinds have been
widely investigated, since the seminal work by Warrington and Shallice (1984). We will
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thus contribute to investigate a specific kind of abstract concepts, namely, institutional
concepts.  Though several studies have been conducted on abstract concepts from the
point  of  view  of  embodied  cognition,  so  far  institutional  concepts  have  not  been
investigated (for an exception see Roversi, Borghi & Tummolini 2013). 
8 The whole study has been conceived as an ideal follow-up to two previous studies that
members  of  our  research  group  have  conducted  in  the  past,  following  both  an
experimental  and  a theoretical  path.  The  experimental  study  (the  just-mentioned
Roversi, Borghi & Tummolini 2013) focused on the conceptualization of institutions and
artefacts:  We tried to show on experimental  grounds that  there are good reasons to
describe legal concepts as akin to artefact concepts, by comparing them with physical
artefacts, on the one hand, and with more abstract social concepts, on the other hand.
The theoretical  study (Roversi  2016)  was devoted to a  theory of  legal  institutions as
metaphoric artefacts, namely, characterized in their evolution by important analogies
and  metaphoric  projections  with  non-normative,  factual  regularities  and  human
capabilities (a phenomenon labelled “institutional mimesis”). Here we evaluate whether
this evolution of legal artefacts has some cognitive basis, focusing on the question of how,
and to what extent, these concepts can be grounded on our conception of more basic,
physical interactions or of more basic, social interactions. The structure of the paper is as
follows. In Section 2, we will present some of the hypotheses about the embodiment of
institutional concepts and “institutional mimesis” that have served as the theoretical
ground for this study. In Section 3, we will explain how the experiment was framed and
present its results. In Section 4, we will discuss the results and suggest some lines for
possible future research.
 
2 Institutional Mimesis: Conjectures about the
Embodiment of Legal Concepts in Terms of Physical
Image Schemas
2.1 Institutional Mimesis: Some Distinctions
9 As mentioned, our conjectures about a possible grounding of institutional concepts on
image schemas of physical interactions, which form the core of this experimental study,
were drawn from a previous study (Roversi 2016) devoted to legal metaphoric artefacts
and the phenomenon there labelled as “institutional mimesis”. Institutional mimesis is
the idealtypical situation in which the constitutive rules defining the interaction plan of a
given legal institution “imitate” or mimic patterns of physical regularities or physical
interactions embedded in a certain, culture-relative conception of “nature” or physical
reality. Institutional mimesis can be hermeneutic or genetic, depending on its role in the
creation  of  the institution  in  question,  and  it  can  also  be  cosmological,  ecological,  or
ethological, depending on the kind of physical image schemas it is based on. 
10 Institutional  mimesis  is  genetic when it  played  a  role  in  the  creative  process  of  the
institution in question, whereas it is hermeneutic when it is used as a way to legitimize or
interpret an institution which was created on independent grounds. Very often it is
difficult to sharply distinguish between genetic and hermeneutic mimesis in practice,
because the way in which legal artefacts are interpreted plays a role in their deliberative
history, hence in the way in which they are framed. Thus, the distinction between genetic
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and  hermeneutic  mimesis  is,  to  a  great  extent,  only  idealtypical.  However,  the
experimental  study presented in this  paper  focuses  on genetic  institutional  mimesis,
because it addresses the question of the phylogenesis of legal institutions by studying
their ontogenesis in terms of embodied cognition, hence their rooting in the cognitive
processes of human beings. 
11 Institutional mimesis is cosmological when the image schema of physical reality represents
some sort of “law of nature” or natural regularity in which human interaction does not
play any role: for example, the planetary system, the human organism, or a taxonomy of
different kinds of physical bodies.  Institutional mimesis is instead ecological when the
relevant  image  schema  represents  an  interaction  between  human  beings  and  their
physical environment: for example, a human who acts and has a causal impact on the
surrounding environment, or one who stands up and follows a path. Finally, institutional
mimesis is ethological when the image schema it is based on represents a physical or brute
interaction among two or more human beings: for example, taking away with violence, or
touching another human being. 
12 Let  us  now  give  some  examples  of  institutional  mimesis  relevant  for  this  study,  as
presented in Roversi 2016. 
 
2.2 State as an Ordered System of Bodies
13 One of the conjectures we tried to test in this experimental study is that the concept of
State can be connected with an image schema traceable to an ordered system of bodies.
This conjecture is based on the cosmological institutional mimesis between the modern
concept  of  State  and  the  Newtonian  conception  of  physics  which  was  described  in
Stephen Toulmin’s 1990 book Cosmopolis. In this work, Toulmin maintains that the rise of
the modern concept of State as a unified political framework, organized according to an
internal rationality and in a sense universal, should be viewed as inextricably intertwined
with a specific conception of the natural world: the conception encapsulated in by the
new,  mathematical  science  which  emerged  in  the  same  period  and  whose  foremost
champion was Isaac Newton. Writes Toulmin:
Between  1660  and  1720,  few  thinkers  were  only  interested  in  accounting  for
mechanical  phenomena  in  the  physical  world.  For  most  people,  just  as  much
intellectual underpinnings was required for the new patterns of social practice, and
associated ideas about the polis. As a result, enticing new analogies entered social
and political  thought:  if,  from now on,  “stability” was the chief  virtue of  social
organization, was it not possible to organize political ideas about Society along the
same lines as scientific ideas about Nature? (Toulmin 1992: 107)
14 Elsewhere in the same work he adds: 
From 1700 on, social  relations within the nation-state were defined in horizontal
terms  of  superordination and  subordination,  based  on  class  affiliation:  the  “lower
orders” as a whole were seen as subordinate and inferior to the “better sort” as a
whole. Each class had its place in the horizontal system that constituted a nation-
state, and at the summit of the structure was the King. Social place was typically
defined by  the status  of  the  men involved,  and was  applied to  their  wives  and
children  by  association.  As  a  by-product  of  the  nation-state,  class  distinction
became, as never before, the crucial organizing principle of all society. In France
especially, the key force in society was the monarch’s “solar” power to control (and
illuminate)  the  state’s  activities.  […]  Here,  the  planetary  model  of  society  was
explicitly cosmopolitical. Without such a justification, the imposition of hierarchy on
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“the  lower  orders”  by  “the  better  sort”  of  people  would  be  arbitrary  and  self-
serving.  To  the  extent  that  this  hierarchy  mirrored  the  structure  of  nature,  its
authority  was  self-explanatory,  self-justifying,  and  seemingly  rational.  (Toulmin
1992: 133; italics mine in the last occurrence)
15 In the final part of this second passage, Toulmin’s idea is put in remarkably clear terms:
Since the beginning of the 18th century, the hierarchical structure connected with the
modern state could be seen as “mirroring” the structure of nature and thus could be
justified  by  this  analogy.  But,  conversely,  the  scientific  conception  of  nature  that
underpinned this  analogy was in its  own turn strengthened from its  very  birth by its
justificatory power: “[T]he world view of modern science—as it actually came into existence
—won public support around 1700 for the legitimacy it apparently gave to the political
system of  nation-states  as  much as  for  its  power  to  explain  the  motion of  planets”
(Toulmin 1992: 128). 
 
2.3 Parliament as a Single Body
16 Another conjecture based on a cosmological institutional mimesis which was tested in
this study is that the concept of Parliament can be grounded on an image schema of a
single body, and not of a multitude of bodies working together. This conjecture is based
on Karl  Olivecrona’s studies about the emergence of the concept of corporation (and
hence of “collective” legal bodies) in ancient Roman law in terms of a separate entity, not
consisting merely of a collection of parts. In his 1928 essay “Corporations as universitates,”
Olivecrona maintains that, in Roman legal thought, the very idea of a corporation having
a legal personality separate from that of its individual members depended on its being
considered a separate entity, something which can exist not simply as a mere collection
of parts. This was possible in light of a specific distinction between three kinds of natural
corpora, a distinction that can be found in the Stoic philosophers and that was accepted by
the  Roman  jurists.  According  to  this  distinction,  which  is  clearly  formulated  by
Pomponius in a famous passage (Digest, 41, 3, 30, pr.) and can be found in Seneca as well,
there are three kinds of corpora to be found in nature: homogeneous objects of a given
species whose parts are melted together and have no separate standing, for example, a
statue; objects of a given species whose parts have their own separate species but are
connected in a coherent way, for example, a ship (corpus ex cohaerentibus); and, finally,
objects  of  a  given species  whose parts  have their  own separate species  and are also
physically independent, for example, a herd of sheep (corpus ex distantibus). According to
Olivecrona,  the  universitates  discussed by  the  Roman jurists  were  to  be  conceived as
corpora ex distantibus:
As corpora of the third class corporations were similar in nature to other corpora
belonging to this class. The fundamental rules concerning their rights and duties
are only applications of the general theory of corpora. The essential thing is that the
entity is  a  corpus,  distinct  from  the  parts,  with  an  individuality  that  remains
unchanged despite changes in the parts. The rules are inferences drawn from these
assumptions. (Olivecrona 1949: 35)
17 As in the case of  Toulmin’s hypothesis on the rise of  the modern state,  here a legal
organization is  created  in  such a  way that  it  mirrors  natural  reality  according  to  a
common—we would say “scientific,” according to the standards of the period—conception
of it:
The classification of corpora refers to their objective nature; it is founded on natural
science without consideration of social convenience. In their arguments the jurists
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assume that the classification is scientifically correct; this is the reason why they
use it in their interpretation of law. (Olivecrona 1949: 29)
 
2.4 Contract as Contact and Transmission
18 An example of ethological institutional mimesis tested in this experimental study is the
conjecture that the idea of contract can be traced to an image schema of contact and
transmission  between  human  beings.  This  conjecture  is  based  on  Axel  Hägerström’s
reconstruction of legal transactions in ancient Roman law and particularly of the Roman
concept of promissio, an ancestor of our concept of contract. A promissio in Roman law was
a  legal  transaction  through  which  persons  could  undertake  an  obligation  under  ius
gentium, that is, even if they were not Roman citizens (the corresponding transaction for
Roman citizens was instead the sponsio, as described, for example, by Gaius in Digest 1, 3,
93). Now, in the second volume of his 1941 Der Romische Obligationsbegriff (the first volume
was written in 1927), Axel Hägerström argues that a promissio could take place only by
offering (literally “putting forward,” pro-mittere) the right hand, which had to be accepted
by  the  promisee  in  order  for  the  transaction  to  be  validly  performed.  In  his  view,
however, such a contact between right hands was necessary for the transaction to happen
because some sort of “fluid” or “force” was thought to be transmitted in nature upon
contact,  and this force in a sense entailed a communion framed in normative terms.
Hägerström writes in this regard: 
In the dextra there is a particular internal force through which a person’s objectives
can  be  achieved.  By  way  of  a  dextrarum  iunctio,  the  respective  forces  are
supernaturally merged [vereinigt], and in this way a mystic community is created in
what concerns the sources of those forces. Compare this idea with the primitive
conceptions  about  forces  enclosed in  external  objects  mystically  transmitted by
physical contact or more generally by external contiguity [äusseres Zusammensein].
These  forces  are  conceived  as  fluida,  which  are  transmitted  from one  object  to
another. If the original connection has been organic, a supernatural communion of
destinies also arises. (Hägerström 1941: 162; our translation)
 
2.5 President as Something Having a Causal Effect
19 Another  conjecture  that  we  tested  has  to  do  with  a  possible  case  of  ecological
institutional mimesis underlying the concept of authority. Here, we conjectured that the
concept of an authority, like that of President, can be grounded on an image schema
representing something having an actual  physical  impact  on other bodies.  There are
several  anthropological  and  historical  studies  that  could  support  such  a  hypothesis.
Consider for example kingship, conceived as the highest power within a given political
organization. It has been observed in the anthropological literature that in many cultures
the normative powers of a king—in essence,  his authority—were originally connected
with that king’s actual ability to produce effects in nature. James George Frazer provides
us with many examples of this connection in the chapters of The Golden Bough devoted to
“magicians as kings.” Consider the case of kings as “rainmakers” in African culture:
[A]mong the Wagogo of East Africa the main power of the chiefs, we are told, is
derived from their art of rain-making. If a chief cannot make rain himself, he must
procure it from some one who can. Again, among the tribes of the Upper Nile the
medicine-men are generally the chiefs. Their authority rests above all upon their
supposed power of making rain. […] In Ussukuma, a great district on the southern
bank of the Victoria Nyanza, “the rain and locust question is part and parcel of the
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Sultan's government. He, too, must know how to make rain and drive away the
locusts.  If  he  and  his  medicine-men  are  unable  to  accomplish  this,  his  whole
existence is at stake in times of distress. On a certain occasion, when the rain so
greatly desired by the people did not come, the Sultan was simply driven out (in
Ututwa, near Nassa). The people, in fact, hold that rulers must have power over
Nature and her phenomena […].” (Frazer 2009: 204–209)
20 This mimetic connection between a king’s normative powers and his causal capacities can
be found at the root of European culture as well. In Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-
européennes,  of 1969, Émile Benveniste notes, for example, that the verb most used in
Greek Homeric tragedy for “rule,” namely, kraínō (in the Homeric form), is connected
with the idea of executing and realizing and signifies an actual effect in the world (see
Benveniste 1969: 35). Moreover, Pietro De Francisci (1959: 361ff.) has described in great
detail,  and  with  specific  reference  to  ancient  Roman  culture,  the  passage  from  the
recognition of different kinds of actual abilities (among which technical abilities, brute
force, and courage) to the attribution of normative powers. Clearly, such an ability to
produce effects in the natural world is ultimately connected with the idea that kings must
be able to bring about natural effects which are in some sense “good” for their people: An
example would be a plentiful harvest. This idea is almost ubiquitous. It can be found in
Asian culture: 
Thus the ancient Hindoo law-book called The Laws of Manu describes as follows the
effects of a good king’s reign: “In that country where the king avoids taking the
property of mortal sinners, men are born in due time and are long-lived. And the
crops of the husbandmen spring up, each as it was sown, and the children die not,
and no misshaped offspring is born.” (Frazer 2009: 215)
21 But the same connection can be found in the Odyssey, XIX, 110ff. (“Your fame rises to high
heaven, like the fame of a peerless king, who, fearing the gods, rules many brave men and
upholds the law. The people prosper under his leadership, and the dark soil yields wheat
and barley, the trees are heavy with fruit, the ewes never fail to bear, and the sea is full of
fish”) and, again according to Benveniste, at the etymological roots of the English word
lord, which is thought to derive from the ancient compound hlāford, whose first element is
hlaf, namely, “bread.” Hence, the lord would be “he who can bring bread to his people”
(see  Benveniste  1969:  26–27).  Moreover,  as  Marc  Bloch  writes  in  his  1924  Les  Rois
Thaumaturges, this connection eventually produced the idea, widely shared in the Middle
Ages and instrumental to the construction of kingly authority in Europe, that “real” kings
must have thaumaturgical powers. Bloch provides us with an accurate description of the
birth  and  death  of  this  idea.  In  particular,  he  shows  in  detail  how  the  supposed
thaumaturgical power attributed to the kings of the Capetian dynasty is a result of a
“blending” between the ancient German conception according to which kings must have
an effective ability to manipulate nature and the Christian translation of this idea in
terms of the king’s “holy powers,” akin to those of king-priests such as Melchisedec in
Genesis (see Bloch 1961: 57ff.).
 
2.6 Marriage as Tearing, Taking Away with Violence
22 Our conjecture regarding authority is connected with another one regarding marriage,
namely,  that  the  concept  of  marriage  could  be  grounded  on  an  image  schema
representing tearing,  or  taking something away with violence.  Let  us  show how this
connection goes. Legal anthropology shows not only that in many cultures the normative
powers of kings mirror their factual powers over nature, but also that as a consequence of
Institutional mimesis: an experimental study on the grounding of legal concepts
Revus, 32 | 2017
8
this fact kings had to be chosen just by evaluating their actual abilities.  According to
Frazer, Latin kings were originally chosen on an annual basis by way of a race or a fight,
this in order to ensure that the candidate did in fact have the actual natural abilities
required for the normative powers of a king. And this original procedure survived in
symbolic form in later ceremonies:
A relic of that test perhaps survived in the ceremony known as the Flight of the
King  (regifugium),  which  continued  to  be  annually  observed  at  Rome  down  to
imperial times. On the twenty-fourth day of February a sacrifice used to be offered
in the Comitium, and when it was over the King of the Sacred Rites fled from the
Forum. We may conjecture that the Flight of the King was originally a race for an
annual kingship, which may have been awarded as a prize to the fleetest runner. At
the end of the year the king might run again for a second term of office; and so on,
until he was defeated and deposed or perhaps slain. In this way what had once been
a race would tend to assume the character of a flight and a pursuit. The king would
be given a start; he ran and his competitors ran after him, and if he were overtaken
he had to yield the crown and perhaps his life to the lightest of foot among them. In
time a man of masterful character might succeed in seating himself permanently on
the throne and reducing the annual race or flight to the empty form which it seems
always to have been within historical times. (Frazer 2009: 375–376)
23 Now, Frazer notes that the Latin selection of kings on the basis of actual abilities very
likely had a precise parallelism with the way in which marriages were celebrated, namely,
by selecting candidates on the basis of their ability to actually reach their bride in a sort
of race. As Frazer notes, this custom was common to many cultures:
These traditions may very well reflect a real custom of racing for a bride, for such a
custom appears to have prevailed among various peoples, though in practice it has
degenerated into a mere form or pretence. Thus “there is one race, called the ‘Love
Chase,’ which may be considered a part of the form of marriage among the Kirghiz.
In  this  the  bride,  armed  with  a  formidable  whip,  mounts  a  fleet  horse,  and  is
pursued by all the young men who make any pretensions to her hand. She will be
given as a prize to the one who catches her, but she has the right, besides urging on
her horse to the utmost, to use her whip, often with no mean force, to keep off
those lovers who are unwelcome to her, and she will probably favour the one whom
she has already chosen in her heart.” The race for the bride is found also among the
Koryaks of North-eastern Asia. It takes place in a large tent, round which many
separate compartments called pologs are arranged in a continuous circle. The girl
gets a start and is clear of the marriage if she can run through all the compartments
without being caught by the bridegroom. The women of  the encampment place
every obstacle in the man's way, tripping him up, belabouring him with switches,
and so forth, so that he has little chance of succeeding unless the girl wishes it and
waits for him. Similar customs appear to have been practised by all the Teutonic
peoples; for the German, Anglo- Saxon, and Norse languages possess in common a
word for marriage which means simply bride-race. Moreover, traces of the custom
survived into modern times. (Frazer 2009: 372–373)
24 A curious confirmation of this practice can be found in the Greek myth of Atalanta (who
agreed to marry only the man who could outrun her in a footrace), as well as in Willem
Van Rubruk’s Itinerarium in the lands of the Mongols, a report written in the 13th century.
In this last description, it is quite clear that the procedure through which marriage was
celebrated in the Mongolian culture at that time mirrored some sort of brutal act similar
to kidnapping:
Once a marriage has been arranged, the bride’s father organizes a banquet and she
flees, hiding with her parents. At which point the father will say: “My daughter is
yours—find her and take her.” And so the bridegroom sets out to search for her
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with his friends until he finds her. He must then take her by force and bring her
home, pretending that he is forcing her to do so. (Willem Van Rubruk, Itinerarium,
VII, 5; our translation)
25 These forms of marriage are examples of ethological institutional mimesis. The idea is
that the way in which a woman “binds herself” from a normative point of view, thus
entering into a relationship of mutual rights and duties with a man, had to mirror the
way in which a woman can be bound in a brutal, merely factual sense. Such a mimetic
relation between marriage and kidnap, though also traceable to the roots of European
legal culture, is particularly unacceptable from a modern legal perspective, and indeed
we  could  debate  about  how  much  of  the  original  “capture  model”  still  lingers  in
contemporary theories of marriage. But even if we concluded that this kind of mimesis
plays  no  such  role  any  longer  in  contemporary  Western  legal  culture,  the  mimetic
relation here described can become relevant when comparing our legal conceptions with
that of other cultures. In the quite famous case People v. Moua (Fresno County California
Super.  Ct.  Feb.  7,  1985),  for  example,  institutional  mimesis  is  fundamental  in
understanding  how  something  which  is  seen  as  abduction  and  rape  from  our  legal
perspective can become a marriage from another,  and clearly this  can have a direct
impact on the way we interpret the intentional element of illicit behaviour. In a 2002
work on “cultural defense,” Martin Golding shows how, in this case,
cultural evidence was used to reduce a charge of kidnapping and rape to the lesser
offense of false imprisonment. Moua belonged to a Hmong tribe from Laos which
practices marriage-by-capture. In this ritual a man abducts a woman to his family’s
home, where the marriage is consummated. The practice calls for the woman to
show her virtuousness by protesting the man’s advances. Defendant Moua abducted
a woman of Laotian descent from the Fresno City College campus, where she was
employed,  and  had  sexual  relations  with  her  despite  her  protests.  She  filed  a
criminal  complaint,  charging  Moua  with  kidnapping  and  rape.  At  trial,  Moua
maintained that he did not force sexual relations on the victim because he believed
that  her  protests  were  in  line  with  the  marriage-by-capture  ritual.  The  judge
accepted  Moua’s  claim  but  he  also  held  that  the  victim  had  not  genuinely
consented.  Moua’s  mistake  of  fact  defense  was  successful  in  overcoming  the
kidnapping and rape charges, but he was held guilty of the lesser offense of false
imprisonment. (Golding 2002: 148; see also Donovan 2008: ch. 18)
 
2.7 Trials as Standing Up and Following a Path
26 Finally, we tested a conjecture concerning legal procedures, and trials in particular. Here,
the idea is that the concept of trial could be grounded on an image schema representing
something that “emerges”, or stand up, and that follows a specific path. The rationale for
this hypothesis is drawn from a debate on constitutional law in the United States, namely,
the idea of one’s “standing” before a court. This idea, which incidentally many parallels in
other legal cultures (l’interesse ad agire in Italy and die Klagebefugnis in Germany, among
others), means that the plaintiff in a lawsuit must be able to demonstrate that he or she
has a sufficiently concrete and personal interest in a dispute as a formal condition for
being entitled to have the courts decide the merits of that dispute. Now, according to
Steven Winter in his pioneering 1988 article “The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance,” this idea is essentially metaphoric: It basically evokes the several
common meanings  of  “standing”  by  which  we  can describe  an  individual’s  ordinary
behaviour:
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The metaphor  of  “standing”  is  a  myth that  has  become “the literal  truth”  and
shaped—or misshaped—our thinking about adjudication. It has shaped our thinking
about adjudication to conform to two separate “truths” embedded in the metaphor,
and to think about them as one. The first is the “truth” of individualism: One stands
alone;  one  stands  up;  one  stands  apart;  one  stands  out;  one  stands  head  and
shoulders above the crowd. […] The second “truth” embodied in the metaphor is
that the individual must have a particular kind of relationship to the court whose
power he or she is seeking to invoke: A court will only consider what a party has to
say if he or she is standing (read: has “standing”). (Winter 1988: 1387f)
27 On this interpretation, one of the conditions for accessing the legal artifact “trial” in the
United States tacitly mirrors the way in which we can “stand” in ordinary life. And this
gives rise to what Winter calls a “private-rights” model of procedural justice, which in its
own turn is metaphoric:
Modern standing  law  defines  this  relationship  between  the  individual  and  the
process  in  terms  of  a  particular  cognitive  model:  the  private  rights  model.  We
structure this model by means of two metaphors premised on the source-path-goal
schema:  a  causal  source-path-goal  metaphor  and  a  remedial  source-path-goal
metaphor. We identify the subject matter of a lawsuit through the elements of the
causal schema. The defendant’s act is the source, the causal chain is the path, and
the  plaintiff’s  injury  is  the  goal.  The  remedial  source-path-goal  metaphor  is
virtually a mirror image of the causal one: The individual’s injury is the source of a
process that has as its goal an order from the court redressing that injury; the path
that connects them is the plaintiff’s proof that the acts of the defendant caused the
injury.  The mirror image quality of these two source-path-goal metaphors gives
rise to the conception of damages and other forms of legal redress as designed “to
put the plaintiff back in the position he occupied” (or as near as possible) before
occurrence of the legal wrong. (Winter 1988: 1388)
28 Another metaphor thus emerges here: the idea that a legal trial mimics a causal chain
having a source, a path, and a goal. In Winter’s words, “[o]ur use of the causal source-
path-goal metaphor to conceptualize the subject matter of a lawsuit overlaps with our use
of source-path-goal metaphors to structure our view of both purposes and causation”
(Winter 1988, 1390). And this complex example of institutional mimesis has far-reaching
consequences on the way in which the scope of the judicial process is thought of and
described in current American legal doctrine.
 
3 The Experimental Study
3.1 Motivations
29 The purpose of this study was to test whether (1) the conceptualization of basic legal
institutions can be grounded on non-normative image schemas representing physical
interactions or is rather more dependent on social factors, and (2) whether in this regard
legal institutions are different from abstract concepts and concepts of concrete artefacts. 
 
3.2 Method and Assumptions
30 To assess the relevance of the image schemas for the selected concepts we adopted a
priming paradigm. Participants were presented by images followed by target sentences,
and their task consisted in evaluating whether the sentence made sense or not.  Two
independent variables were manipulated within participants: the variable kind of concept
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(institutional, abstract, concrete) and the variable kind of animation (physical, socialized,
control). For all the concepts considered, all the participants were requested to see three
animations  on  a  laptop  computer:  one  representing  the  image  schema  of  physical
interactions for a few seconds (experimental condition 1 - physical), one representing the
same  image  schema  presented  in  (1)  but  with  images  eliciting  social  factors  and
interactions (experimental condition 2 - socialized), one representing a similar image schema
but with a different pattern of interaction (control condition). After each animation, the
participants were presented with a sentence in Italian that included the relevant concept:
their task was to decide by pressing a different key on the keyboard whether the sentence
was meaningful or not as fast as they could, without however giving up to accuracy. Five
“catch  trials”  were  introduced  in  order  to  preserve  attention:  Participants  were
instructed specifically not to press any key if they had seen a shape coloured in black in
the video. The order of presentation of the trials was completely randomized. The test
was programmed so as to ensure that participants could not see two animations related
with the same concept without first performing at least two other trials related with
different concepts. In order to control for the effect of the specific wording of a given
sentence,  participants  were  divided in  three  groups,  and the  same sentence  (both a
meaningful or non-meaningful one) was associated with a different animation (1, 2, or
control)  depending  on  the  group.  Reaction  times  and  errors  were  recorded  by  the
software. All the participants were students from the Law Faculty of the University of
Bologna,  aged  between  19  and  23.  Participants  were  specifically  instructed  with  a
presentation at the beginning of the test, and they made four “training” trials in presence
of examiners in order to ensure they had understood. All the other trials were submitted
to participants in absence of examiners. 24 students participated on a voluntary basis; the
data of 3 participants had to be dropped (2 from Group 3 and 1 from Group 2) because the
participants reported misunderstandings and problems. 
 
3.3 Materials
31 Taking into account the conjectures presented in Roversi 2016 and summarized above in
Section 2, we selected 8 basic legal concepts (contract, state, president, (subjective) right,
marriage, parliament, trial, property) and attributed to each of them one corresponding
image schema of physical interactions. Two of these eight concepts were added to the list
of  those  discussed  above:  (subjective)  right,  connected  with  the  image  schema  of
activating something by touching it, and property, connected with the image schema of
touching and transforming. Adopting the same kind of contrast which turned out to be
useful  in Roversi,  Borghi  & Tummolini  2013,  we also selected 8 concepts of  concrete
artefacts  (hammer,  wheel,  knife,  pot,  spoon,  tower,  umbrella,  bed)  and  8  abstract
concepts (friendship, concentration, culture,  fantasy, anger,  dialogue, reasoning, will).
Both for concrete and abstract concepts, the image schemas selected were not identified
in the light of historical or anthropological hypotheses but rather in terms of ordinary
metaphorical or functional associations: for example, fantasy as creation or hammer as
impact. The concepts and corresponding image schemas are summarized as follows: 
Kind of Concept Concept Image Schema
Institutional Contract contact and transmission
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State ordered collection of bodies
President causal effect
Right activate through an arm
Marriage tear, take away
Parliament something “comes out” from a single object
Trial something “stands” and follows a path
Property something is transformed
Abstract
Friendship balance, harmony
Concentration focus, an object enlarges
Culture connections between objects, network
Fantasy something “comes out” or is produced
Anger violent crash
Dialogue two objects contact and proceed together
Reasoning path
Will something resists an impact
Concrete
Hammer squash
Wheel rotation
Knife divide
Pot hold and modify
Spoon hold and raise
Tower raise and keep up
Umbrella protect from above
Bed something lies down
Table 1. Concepts and Corresponding Image Schemas
32 For each image schema of physical interaction, a separate video was created representing
that interaction by way of coloured geometrical shapes in animation. Both the colours
and shapes were completely random, but the movement and interactions among them
were  framed  according  to  the  image  schema.  All  the  movies  were  produced
independently by one of us, and the others reviewed and commented them and asked for
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revisions.  Following  are  some  snapshots  taken  from  the  videos  (colours  cannot  be
represented in print, but as said they were completely random). This is the video for
“marriage” under experimental condition 1,  testing the image schema of tearing and
taking away something from something else: 
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Figure 1. Image Schema for the Concept “Marriage” (Snapshots)
33 This is the video for “contract” under experimental condition 1, testing the image schema
of contact and transmission of something:
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Figure 2. Image Schema for the Concept “Contract” (Snapshots)
34 This is the video for “will” under experimental condition 1, testing the image schema of
resisting an impact: 
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Figure 3. Image Schema for the Concept “Will” (Snapshots)
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35 Finally, this is an example of a socialized video under experimental condition 2, in which
face emoticons appear within the same image schema as that proposed under condition 1.
This is the video for contract, to be compared with Figure 2 above:
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Figure 4. Image Schema for the Concept (Contract) – Socialized (Shapshots)
36 For each concept we prepared six sentences to be used as tasks: three meaningful and
three meaningless. All the sentences were syntactically well-formed, independent clauses
in Italian, approximately of the same length. All the sentences were created by one of us
and then reviewed and discussed by the others, and several of them were modified in this
process. We tried to keep them as simple as possible in order to let the participants focus
on the relevant concepts. Following are some examples of sentences we ended up with
(translated into English from Italian): 
Concept Meaningful sentence Meaningless sentence
Contract
This contract is fraudulent.
Our contract says that I can do it.
They are bound by a contract
They have massaged a contract.
They play different variants out of the contract.
This contract comes with porridge.
Umbrella
The umbrella is sheltering me.
The umbrella is open.
The umbrella is protecting me.
The umbrella is mountainous.
The umbrella is deductive.
This umbrella has the flu.
Anger
Anger never leaves me.
Anger is overtaking me.
Anger is blinding me.
Anger is a type of dolphin.
Your anger measures 12 inches.
Your anger is Corinthian.
Table 2. Examples of Sentences Used as Tasks
 
3.4 Hypotheses
37 We predicted a main effect of kind of concept, replicating the concreteness effect often
found in the literature (Paivio et al. 1994), i.e. the advantage in response times of concrete
compared  to  abstract  concepts.  Further,  we  hypothesized  that  the  performance  of
institutional concepts would be more similar to that of other abstract concepts than to
concrete concepts in terms of cognitive elaboration. 
38 More crucially,  we predicted faster  reaction times if  the image elicited by the video
contributed to ground the concept under consideration. Our idea was to test whether
institutional concepts and other abstract concepts can be “grounded” in image schemas
(a) of physical interaction or rather (b) of social interactions. In the first case we predict
that reaction times of trials under experimental condition 1 (physical) will be lower than
those  under  experimental  condition 2  (socialized)  and control  condition;  in  case  (b),
reaction times of trials under experimental condition 2 (socialized) will be lower than
those under experimental condition 1 (physical) and control.
39 Finally, we also expected an interaction between kind of concept and kind of animation:
specifically,  if  abstract and  institutional  concepts  are  characterized  by  the  social
dimension more than concrete concepts,  with them responses with social  animations
should be faster. 
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3.5. Results
40 Table 3 and 4 show comparisons among the average reaction times depending on the kind
of concept (institutional, abstract, concrete): 
Kind  of
concept
Average
Standard
Error
Degrees  of
freedom
95% Confidence Interval
 
Lower
Limit
Higher
Limit
Abstract 1509,644 51,201 29,377 1404,985 1614,303
Concrete 1488,750 51,206 29,389 1384,081 1593,418
Institutional 1562,469 51,255 29,500 1457,719 1667,219
Table 3. Average Reaction Times by Kind of Concept
Kind  of
concept (I)
Kind  of
concept (J)
Difference
between
Averages
(I)-(J)
Standard
Error
Degrees
of
freedom
Significance
95%  Confidence
Interval  for  the
Difference
      
Lower
Limit
Higher
Limit
Abstract
Concrete 20,894 18,105 574,252 ,747 -22,576 64,364
Institutional -52,825 18,243 585,047 ,012 -96,625 -9,025
Concrete
Abstract -20,894 18,105 574,252 ,747 -64,364 22,576
Institutional -73,719 18,258 584,153 ,000 -117,554 -29,885
Institutional
Abstract 52,825 18,243 585,047 ,012 9,025 96,625
Concrete 73,719 18,258 584,153 ,000 29,885 117,554
Table 4. Comparisons between Average Reaction Times by Kind of Concept (Statistically
Significant Ones in Bold)
41 Tables 3 and 4 show, on the one hand, that reaction times were faster with abstract than
with concrete concepts; but also, on the other hand, that reaction times were faster with
institutional concepts than with both abstract and concrete concepts—and this last result
is supported by statistical significance. These results confirm hypothesis (2) above in an
unexpected way: not only abstract and institutional concepts seem to require a higher
degree  of  cognitive  elaboration  than  concrete  ones—a  result  that  is  coherent  with
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already-existing research on concreteness effect —, but institutional concepts require an
even higher degree of elaboration than other abstract concepts. 
42 Tables 5 and 6 show comparisons among the average reaction times depending on the
kind of animation (physical, socialized, control):
Kind  of
Animation
Average
Standard
Error
Degrees  of
freedom
95% Confidence Interval
 
Lower
Limit
Higher
Limit
Control 1518,833 51,103 29,153 1414,340 1623,326
Socialized 1522,113 51,162 29,287 1417,520 1626,706
Physical 1519,917 51,141 29,240 1415,359 1624,475
Table 5. Average Reaction Times by Kind of Animation
Kind  of
Animation
(I)
Kind  of
Animation
(J)
Difference
between
Averages
(I)-(J)
Standard
Error
Degrees
of
freedom
Significance
95%  Confidence
Interval  for  the
Difference
      
Lower
Limit
Higher
Limit
Control
Socialized -3,280 17,454 1186,274 1,000 -45,125 38,565
Physical -1,084 17,395 1185,068 1,000 -42,787 40,620
Socialized
Control 3,280 17,454 1186,274 1,000 -38,565 45,125
Physical 2,196 17,550 1178,051 1,000 -39,877 44,270
Physical
Control 1,084 17,395 1185,068 1,000 -40,620 42,787
Socialized -2,196 17,550 1178,051 1,000 -44,270 39,877
Table 6. Comparisons between Average Reaction Times by Kind of Animation (Statistically
Significant Ones in Bold)
43 The data presented in Tables 5 and 6 do not support hypothesis (1). On average, reaction
times under physical or socialized conditions are not lower than under control conditions.
On the contrary, reaction times under control conditions are slightly lower than under
socialized conditions, but in general reaction times are similar. Anyway, none of these
results show statistical significance. 
44 Table 7 shows the average reaction times depending on the kind of animation (physical,
socialized, control) and the kind of concept (institutional, abstract, concrete).
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Kind  of
concept
Kind  of
animation
Averages
Standard
Error
Degrees  of
freedom
95%  Confidence
Interval
     
Lower
Limit
Higher
Limit
Abstract
Control 1508,125 54,018 36,383 1398,611 1617,639
Socialized 1529,809 54,243 36,991 1419,901 1639,717
Physical 1490,998 53,932 36,151 1381,635 1600,360
Concrete
Control 1512,073 53,910 36,095 1402,748 1621,399
Socialized 1468,713 54,107 36,621 1359,044 1578,382
Physical 1485,463 54,199 36,871 1375,631 1595,294
Institutional
Control 1536,300 54,149 36,736 1426,556 1646,043
Socialized 1567,818 54,222 36,934 1457,946 1677,689
Physical 1583,290 54,265 37,051 1473,343 1693,237
Table 7. Average Reaction Times by Kind of Animation and Kind of Concept 
45 None of these results show statistical significance. 
 
4 Conclusion
46 We obtained two main results with this experimental study. First, the data we collected
show that institutional, legal concepts require a higher degree of cognitive elaboration
than other abstract concepts, and both abstract and institutional concepts a higher one
than  concrete  concepts.  This  opens  up  a  new  conjecture  for  studies  in  embodied
cognition, namely, that the elaboration of abstract concepts can be subject to levels of
complexity,  or  also  degrees  of  detachment  from the  more  grounded,  basic  concrete
concepts. Specifically, as anticipated in the introduction, it is the first time in which the
specificity of institutional concepts compared to other kinds of abstract concepts has
been investigated.  The only exception is  represented by our previous study (Roversi,
Borghi  & Tummolini  2013)  in which we did not  analyse processing speed but  rather
investigated the pattern of associated relations using a feature-generation task. Our work
widely contributes to recent studies analyzing fine-grained differences among sub-kinds
of abstract concepts. Such an investigation is pivotal also because one of the main reasons
of  the  difficulty  in  creating  a  unitary  theory  of  abstract  concepts  lies  in  their
heterogeneity and differences. 
47 Second, the data we collected do not support our conjecture about institutional mimesis,
nor do they support a grounding of institutional concepts in socialized situations. When
considering how different kinds of animation impact on different kinds of concepts, a
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rather scattered scenario emerges, one that is difficult to interpret in a coherent way:
and,  in  any  case,  our  data  did  not  achieve  statistical  significance.  Possible  reasons
underlying this difficulty lie in the kind of stimuli we used – it is namely possible that
participants had difficulties inferring the meaning of the concept from the animations. In
particular, data collected in Table 5 show that average reaction times are very similar
under the different conditions: This suggests that the animations did not achieve their
priming effect.  This “irrelevance” effect can perhaps depend on the fact that,  in our
videos, image schemas were conveyed through geometrical means—geometrical shapes,
colors—which can be a too abstract way of evoking physical patterns.
48 We plan to continue on this line of research with further experimental studies. On the
one hand,  we intend to  find further  empirical  support  to  the idea that  institutional
concepts can be more “detached” than abstract concepts from their grounding and thus
require a higher degree of cognitive elaboration. On the other hand, we intend to modify
our experimental conditions to see whether the grounding of institutional concepts we
conjectured can be observed—thus showing different results than the present study—or
not,  and,  if  not,  what  other  kind  of  effect  can  be  conjectured  when  comparing
institutional and abstract concepts. Moreover, in future research we plan to re-frame the
videos and insert images from “real” physical situations that evoke the image schema, so
as to improve the chance of actually getting a priming effect. 
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